The West Hesitates Again: This Week in Ukraine
WW3 looms, understanding the modern air domain, fighting drones with drones, and more.
Author’s Note: The Flash Traffic Podcast. Yes, we have a podcast! Every weekday morning Eric Lyon, a retired Special Forces colonel, and I sit down and discuss the Ukraine news of the day. It’s one of the first available podcasts on Ukraine of the day. It’s available everywhere, but if you want it immediately, I suggest getting it directly from Spotify here: The Flash Traffic Podcast.
1. Putin Threatens WW3, Again
The latest issue surrounding Western support for Ukraine is allowing the use of Western deep-strike weapons to attack inside Russia. The discussions focus on the use of the US ATACMS missile (with roughly a 190-mile range and a 500-pound warhead) and the British Storm Shadow/French SCALP (which I will refer to as SSS) cruise missile (with roughly a 150-mile range and up to a 2000-pound warhead). The West has already supplied these weapons to Ukraine for use inside their country, but not inside Russia. This week, it was reported that the UK will allow Ukraine to fire the Storm Shadow into Russia.
These weapons won’t change the war, but you wouldn’t know it from how both sides act. Putin, of course, said, “This means war with NATO!” Dmitry Medvedev, Putin’s court jester, made his usual proclamations of the impending nuclear holocaust. Actually, he said Russia would turn Kyiv into a “giant melting pot,” which sounds rather quaintly egalitarian. And, of course, Zelensky said that Ukraine absolutely needs these weapons to be used inside of Russia, or Ukraine will not survive. And, of course, Biden said, well, Biden put on a “TRUMP 2024” hat and wandered aimlessly. Regardless, for some reason, everyone seems to be treating this as the most important event in the war.
As previously mentioned, Ukraine already has these missiles, and it’s been using them in Crimea. One argument made by the US DoD is that Russia has already moved most of its aircraft outside of the range of these missiles, so why allow Ukraine to strike inside Russia? This is pure poppycock, as there are plenty of other viable, valuable targets inside of Russia (logistics hubs, command posts, Russian commander’s underground brothels, etc.). Will these missiles, used on Russia proper, change the war? No. Are they good to have, just in case a high-value target pops up? Of course. The Ukrainians should have this technology at the ready, but If given a choice, I’d take more HIMARS. These missiles can’t hit Moscow, so we won’t be seeing THIS anytime soon (yes, you have to click on that link to Twitter to see my conclusion and, I guess, Putin’s conclusion, too).
2. Understanding the Modern Air Domain
Air Forces seem to be grappling with a definition of the air domain. The proliferation of flying drones, big and small, seems to have left air-power theorists needing a new definition for the air domain. The subdomain of the “air littoral” (close air, as in a few thousand feet of altitude) has been suggested, but now, with cheap drones operating at above 12,000 feet and beyond (see “fighting with drones” section below), this term is exceedingly obsolete. The problem with defining the box in which to drop air drones is explaining the capability of conventional air power. Alas, drones are neither a substitute nor a complement to classic air power.
Drones are not a substitute for traditional air power. Last week, in an interview with the Kyiv Independent, former F-16 pilot and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, retired U.S. Air Force General Philip Breedlove, said that he believed Ukraine was forced to develop its drone armada because it had no sufficient air force. This feeble reasoning refuses to consider that any military, regardless of the size of its air force, should desire to use small, cheap air drones. That’s like saying if you have enough A-10s in close air support, you would opt to buy fewer hand grenades. I will buy 1.8 million hand grenades no matter what because they are effective at their cost. The cost is the capability. The US Government Accounting Office now estimates that the F-35 program will exceed $2 trillion dollars. A military could black out the sky for that cost with over 4 billion FPV drones. This example might be a bit reductionist, but air drones are not a substitute for classic air forces; militaries want drones, regardless of the state of their traditional airplanes.
Drones are not a complement to classic air forces. Breedlove pointed out that Ukraine would attempt to field 1.8 million drones this year and that half of these drones would be lost before engaging their targets. He suggested that fewer drones would be lost if Ukraine had traditional air superiority. First, electronic warfare removes a vast number of drones from the battlefield, including high-flying drones like the Shaheds, which often attempt to avoid ground-based air defense (machine guns) by flying at high altitudes, necessitating the use of classic air power in the form of jets or helicopters to destroy them. Drones have become an entirely separate capability that does not need nor support classic air power. Yes, drones fly in the air, but so do Stingers, mortars, HIMARS, and Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bombs. None of these capabilities have anything to do with the Air Force. (Yes, I said GLSDB. It’s rocket artillery and belongs in the Army).
I understand the need for the US Air Force to grasp for relevancy in the age of modern combat. And yes, I recognize the need for militaries to have a small handful of ultra-expensive, capable, air-breathing, human-piloted aircraft to do unique, one-off missions like flying two meters off the deck through the desert to hit a high-value target. But, the modern air domain will soon be dominated by unmanned, cheap drones. Just because the Air Force attempts to gaslight everyone into believing drones are irrelevant in the face of classic air power (a substitute) or somehow dependent on traditional airplanes (a compliment) doesn’t mean it’s true.
3. Fighting With Drones, Not Bullets
Recently, Ukraine has presented several “innovations” in the drone space, including a drone with an RPG (view a second video here), a machine gun drone, and, of course, the dragon’s breath, a fire-breathing drone. But the most significant development in drone warfare (not including the recent increase in the range of FPV drones) is probably the drone war that is happening at higher altitudes.
Recently, there are a number of videos showing Ukrainian quadcopter drones attacking Russian long-loitering, ISR drones (the Orlan or the Supercam, for examples), including one this week of a drone hitting that was launched from another drone hitting a Russian ISR drone (yes, it’s crazy out there). Also this week, a video immerged of one such drone attacking a Russian drone at an altitude of 12,000 feet. Amazing. I would like to hypothesize on what this technological leap means for tactical and operational ISR if Ukraine can destroy Russia’s eyes in the sky, but I’m too preoccupied with what this could mean for civilian air travel: “This is your captain speaking. We’ve reached our cruising altitude of 30,000 feet, and if you look out over the right-side wing, you’ll see a quadcopter with an explosive device. Now, if you look out over the left-side wing, you’ll see a large chunk of the right-side wing.”
4. Like Cats and Dogs
This week, JD Vance sat down with Navy SEAL Shawn Ryan to explain what he thought the Trump peace plan would be. According to Vance, “So I think it goes like this: Trump sits down, says to the Russians, to the Ukrainians, to the Europeans, you guys need to figure out what a peaceful settlement looks like. And it will probably look roughly the same as the current dividing line between Russia and Ukraine. It will become like a demilitarized zone. It will be strongly fortified so that the Russians do not invade again. Ukraine retains its independent sovereignty. Russia receives a guarantee of neutrality from Ukraine, it does not join NATO, it does not join any allied institutions."
Suddenly, Vance, the guy who said in October 2023, "Dude I won't even take calls from Ukraine," is interested in peace in Ukraine. Freeze the war. Create a DMZ. Ukraine not in NATO. All the ingredients for another Russian invasion later. What has me curious is ”does not join any allied institutions.” I hope he is referring to the MAGA movement.
5. [Video] IT’S IN THE FACTORY!
If an FPV drone has you in its sights, you better crank up the old electronic warfare machine quickly. In this week’s video, an orc is being hunted by an FPV drone inside a warehouse. “Suka” is right, comrade!
Something that's worried me for years is that the US military is more interested in protecting it's legacy systems than it is in fighting the next war. We laugh at corruption in Russian and Chinese military procurement without realizing that we have our own version. Mark me as unconvinced that our billion dollar aircraft carriers could survive a 21st century missle/drone attack or that our military is forward thinking enough to have a solution to drone attacks against civilian aircraft. But we have lots of people thinking about funding more legacy systems because, well, that's where their money comes from.
One of the biggest problems is that we keep saying just "drones" or just "UAVs". I do it too. All the time. It's convenient. But it's confusing.
The US DoD has a classification for UAVs. From small to large. So does NATO. Sadly... the classification is based ONLY on size.
For NATO the Class I drone is what we think of when we think of DJI or most crowd sourced drones in Ukraine. The small ones. But even this doesn't tell us much.
What's it's role? How is it crewed/piloted?
There needs to be better naming conventions for this stuff.
I think this issue contributes to bad commentary and reporting. You skillfully point out Breedlove missing the point. Sadly... we have no precision on the point he's making. Because all we have to go on is that he's talking about drones.
Surely he must know that the small UAVs in Ukraine were 50% intel and recon innovation and 50% lack of ammo innovation. But it was 100% lack of ground based ammo that kicked the crowd sourcing and "million drones" initiatives into place. So, Phillip Breedlove's point can at best only be 50% correct. You can make the argument that air dominance will give you good IR. But, that ignores about a million factors. Like time over target. Availability. Most of all... cost. None of this goes away even with air dominance.
Zero line IR will forever be the job of small UAVs. Sorry air forces of the world. Sure, yeah you can get a great birds eye view of it. And that has value. But troop movements with in 50-100 km of the front and other time sensitive intel will never again be the job of a manned aircraft.
PS: here is my very flawed attempt to bring attention to and contribute to solving the UAV naming convention problem. https://researchingukraine.substack.com/p/uas-uav-drone-cruise-missile-whats