Ignoring the West and Getting Things Done: This Week in Ukraine

Ukraine has its biggest chance yet to punish the Putin regime, the West refuses to commit to defeating Russia and is still restricting its most powerful weapons, Nord Stream shenanigans, and more!

1. Waiting to Exhale (and Then Squeeze the Trigger) in Kursk

The invasion of Russia is going swimmingly. The details are still a bit blurry, but Ukraine has occupied at least 444 square miles of Russian territory (more land than Russia has taken from Ukraine in 2024), has pushed almost 28 miles from the border into Russia, has captured nearly 2,000 prisoners, has liberated upwards of 100 settlements and towns, and has thoroughly embarrassed Vladimir Vladimirovich Pudding. The Ukrainian army is still expanding operations, and it looks like it intends to stay in Russia. According to reports, both sides are digging in for the long haul.

Many sources have discussed the what and speculated on the why of Kursk. To me, the most interesting, and currently the most esoteric (due primarily to operational security, or OPSEC) is the how. Recently, in the east, this war has been one of drone-driven omnipresent ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance). On the eastern front, if you move, you will be seen. So, how did Ukraine deliver 10,000 soldiers to Russia’s doorstep?

Russian complacency and incompetence account for much of Ukraine’s nascent success. The Russian side of the border was relatively undefended. Russian drone density was low. Russian defenders were of poor quality. Ostensibly, any human intelligence or overhead imagery indications of Ukrainian amassing were ignored or poorly communicated throughout the Russian command. Russia was resolved to the idea that a significant (beyond the goofy Separatist Brigade thunder-runs) assault across the border was off the table, restricted by the West. And they were right. But they didn’t account for Ukraine taking risks and being bold.

But what of the Ukrainians? How did they pull this off? Clearly, Ukrainian OPSEC was high. The Pentagon didn’t get a heads-up. The White House said it also did not get a warning that Ukraine was conducting the first invasion of Russia since WWII. Although, the Biden Administration is playing it off. Here’s White House spokesperson John Kirby at the start of the invasion: “We’re in touch with our Ukrainian counterparts, and we are working to gain a better understanding of what they’re doing, what their goals are, what their strategy is. And I’m going to leave a little bit of space for us to have those conversations before I try to characterize what’s going on.” Ok, so you had no idea. Got it.

Of course, Ukraine didn’t inform the White House. The Biden administration would have denied the request to invade Russia. You reap what you sow. The West is hesitant and restrictive on anything that will sufficiently punish Russia. Ukraine is punishing its enemy, and America could learn from the invasion. It’s called “war.” By the way, this week is the third anniversary of the unorganized, ill-equipped, poorly-led Taliban defeating the world’s sole superpower in Afghanistan. Sorry, I shouldn’t refer to them as “ill-equipped,” they have plenty of US weapons and vehicles.      

According to the WSJ [gift article here], Ukrainian troop placement was dispersed amongst the forested areas and surrounding towns prior to massing for the assault, a necessary tactic but, again, one that should not have been sufficient given the number of relatively conspicuous heavy weapons (tanks, artillery) Ukraine was able to push to the border. Russian intelligence should have detected these operational-level movements. During the attack, Ukrainian electronic warfare assets in the vanguard were able to disable Russian communications and drone warfare handily. Thus far, Ukraine has savagely and proficiently executed a superb offensive, but not without assuming risk.         

Ukraine has placed itself in a precarious situation. In the east, Russia is still pressing forward, threatening places like Torestk, New York (which may have already fallen to the Russians), Chasiv Yar, and ultimately the logistically significant city of Pokrovsk. I believe the probability of a minor Russian breakthrough is still high. A current refrain from the war pundits is that the Kursk offensive will force the Kremlin to redirect troops from the Donbas in order to expel Ukraine from the homeland. Perhaps, but why? Russia is still making small, costly, but significant gains in Ukraine. Whatever response Gerasimov (or, by extension, Putin’s former bodyguard, Aleksey Dyumin, recently charged with the defense of Kursk—a classic Pudding move) employs in Kursk, the Russian army will not want to jeopardize the existing operation in Ukraine. For this reason, I do not believe Russia will remove significant troops from Ukraine, nor will they reduce pressure on their preexisting operations. I do believe they will reorient VKS (Russian air force) assets from glide-bombing random places in Kharkiv (or what I have now termed “DMPI Russian Roulette”—an inside air force joke brought to you by an Army soldier, you’re welcome) to bombing random locations somewhere in Kursk.

All the problems the Ukrainians faced prior to the Kursk operations will remain. They still have a serious manpower issue. They still face a lack of ammunition. The Russians still have a crippling artillery advantage. The Russians are still meat-assaulting. Yesterday, there were 72 Russian assaults across the Ukrainian front. The zombie horde will continue to advance in Ukraine. One interesting tactical issue for Ukraine is Starlink. The AFU has relied on Starlink since the beginning of the war. Starlink does not work in Russia. Recently, Russia has been successfully interfering with Starlink service inside of Ukraine. Thus far, the Kursk invasion seems to be Starlink-free. Is the AFU learning to live without Starlink? Or will Musk expand the geofence to inside Russia? I doubt it. If Crimea is off limits, surely Kursk and Belgorod are too. Communications will be another issue for Ukraine inside Russia, especially once Russia resets its electronic warfare strategy.   

The West has blocked using the most potent weapons in the Kursk offensive. The UK has denied Ukraine of its Storm Shadow cruise missile, while the US has blocked the use of ATACMS long-range missiles. Both have used the excuse that these munitions are for the defense of Ukraine, which is ridiculous reasoning. The only way to defend Ukraine against Russia is the defeat of Russia. Ukraine needs the range of these missiles to interdict Russian reinforcements and continue their push into Kursk. This constraint continues the West’s half-measures and reluctance to do what is needed to end this war.        

What might we expect in Kursk in the coming days? The Ukrainians are already starting to define the limits of their advance. They have begun destroying bridges, most notably over the river Seym. They have begun to build defense lines. It looks like they are continuing to push in the west and the southeast, although they have met more resistance in the latter. Ukraine needs to define the limits of the objective and hunker down before the Russians mass for any counterattack. Regardless, the Russians, being Russians, will not be able to mount a coordinated maneuver attack against prepared Ukrainian defenses. I’m not sure the usual Russian tactic of methodically flattening everything with artillery will go over well in Russia. They will probably send armored columns for Ukraine to mow down (Ukraine destroyed a column of Russian reinforcements early in the invasion), just as they’ve done in Ukraine. Still, Ukraine must be set and prepared with small unit tactics (ATGMs, artillery, and drones) to make this defense happen.   

One of the biggest and least discussed impacts of the Kursk invasion is how it will probably extend the war. The West and Ukraine were tiring of the long and taxing stalemate in the east, with little prospect of a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive. The Kursk invasion has given Ukraine momentum and reenergized the idea that it has the capacity to inflict unacceptable losses on Russia. Of course, Ukraine has always had the capacity for victory, but lately, it’s been palpable. After gouging out a chuck of the Kursk oblast, Ukraine will not entertain any of Putin’s unfavorable peace rhetoric. Likewise, Putin won’t negotiate while still making incremental and significant gains in the Donbas. Regardless, it will take time for the Kremlin to mount an earnest response to this latest incursion. And the war continues.

The bridge over the river Seym. Have fun trying to pontoon across this river under constant FPV attack, comrade! Can anyone say Siverskyi Donets River Crossing Debacle Part Два? If you don’t recall this particular episode of early Russian buffoonery in the war, you can review it here.

2. Be Bold, and Mighty Forces Will Eventually Come to Your Aid

The Kursk invasion continues to show that Ukraine has a strategy: give Russia a shellacking anywhere and everywhere. Alas, those who want Ukraine to win this war criticize the West for not having a coherent strategy to achieve that end. This accusation is completely misguided. The West has a strategy called “As Long as It Takes,” and it’s negligent and lazy. The West has shown no apprehension about milling its way through this war, deferring to Putin’s sensibilities, slowly infusing Western military capabilities into the AFU after sufficiently desensitizing them with all the allies and the Kremlin, and timidly ensuring its actions don’t threaten Putin’s imaginary redlines, as if destroying the Kerch Bridge will ignite the end of humanity as we know it. This week, we begin a new round of “hesitating to give Ukraine what it needs,” called the JASSM cruise missile.

The Biden administration is now considering giving Ukraine the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM). The cruise missile has a range of 200 miles and would significantly increase Ukraine’s ability to reach out and smack Russia. The US has over 4,000 JASSMs in stock, although the threat from China will reduce the number possibly available to Ukraine. The Ukrainians would most probably have to launch the JASSMs from their Mig-29s—not an impossible task, given their adaption of the US HARM missile. The introduction of JASSM would change the battlefield calculus, at least on the eastern front and in Crimea, given current restrictions on the use of US missiles in Russia proper.   

So now the Ukrainians have another capability to wait on. The usual Western weapon petitioning will begin. For the next 9 to 12 months, the Ukrainians will politic for the delivery of the weapon. The US will tacitly ensure that Russia and Europe are OK with it. The administration will wait until the war starts turning south for the Ukrainians (possibly a limited Russian breakthrough in the Donbas or Zaporizhzhia). Sometime in the next six months, the administration will say that they are seriously considering it again. This probably means that logistics and operational planning have already taken place within Ukraine. A month later, the administration will announce that they’ve officially approved the weapon for Ukrainian use. At that point, the JASSM would have already been operational and being used to strike Russian targets for the last month prior. And the slow dance continues.

Developing strategy is difficult. It’s far easier to sail through the war adrift, carefully measuring responses and avoiding risk. If the Ukrainian invasion of Russia has taught us anything, it’s that a violent plan violently executed is better than a hesitant, milquetoast response to aggression. The West’s strategy shouldn’t be “as long as it takes,” it should be “whatever it takes.”

The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine labeled this picture “art of war.” Sun Tzu would be proud, horrified, or both.

3. Here, Hold My Beer While I Disrupt European Energy Markets

Look. Even if you just have a casual interest in the war in Ukraine, and even if, and this is hard to believe, you’re not intensely interested in European energy markets, you have to read this article in the WSJ (gift article link, so everyone should be able to open it) about the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipeline. The story alone is entertaining enough to make you want to go out and bomb the Russians.

According to the article, the Ukrainians bombed the Nord Stream pipeline! No way! Tell us something we don’t know. What we probably didn’t know is how hilariously ad hoc the initial concept development was (a drunken night of revelry and $300,000 later, no more Russian pipeline), how Zelensky approved the plan but then tried to call it off after, of course, disclosing the details to the West, and how Valerii Zaluzhnyi was ultimately in charge of the plan, and dismissed Zelensky’s request to cancel the operation saying it was on fail-safe mode--it couldn’t be recalled. Ha! This is another example of Ukrainians ignoring the West and getting things done.  

This supposedly is the “yacht” that the Ukrainians used to bomb the Nord Stream Pipeline. How did they fit all that audacity inside that little boat?  

4. You, Too, Can Bomb the Russians!

I would like to take this opportunity to address the handful of billionaires who often read this newsletter. For a paltry $300,000 investment, you, too, could bomb the Russians. Your role will be completely anonymous. Contact me through warvector.com.

I’m only (partially) kidding, but it’s true. You don’t have to travel to Ukraine, endure countless hours on a post-Soviet train, and get some mystery gastrointestinal virus in the field in order to bomb the Russians. There are plenty of opportunities for red-blooded Americans to do their part in reducing the Russian zombie horde.  

You would be surprised at the level of private funding much of the Ukrainian army relies on, especially with the pure volunteers. Last year, I had the pleasure of hanging out with a volunteer mortar team north of Robotyne. Every vehicle, Starlink terminal, uniform item, and everything else was privately funded. It is completely possible to stand-up a volunteer unit (sized to fit your budget: squad, platoon, battalion, brigade) based on private donations. And Ukrainian soldiers need everything. If you’d like to donate to Ukraine, many legitimate sites exist. My personal favorite is united24 (many of the proceeds to this website go directly to making weapons to bomb the Russians).

There I was, interviewing a volunteer mortar team north of Robotyne. Can you find the Starlink terminal in this picture?

5. The Russian Army is a Joke

I make no apologies for the occasional deviation from my usual rigorously-academic speculation on the war in Ukraine. To wit, I present to you the week’s “best” jokes on the Kursk invasion. Warning, they all kind of suck.       

1. Pudding: How is the Special Military Operation going?

General Gerasimov: We are now bombing Russia.

2. A Kursk oblast resident is being interviewed by Russian news. The man relates his harrowing story of the recent invasion: “They came out of nowhere. Three soldiers. They raped my dog, raped my pig. And then, they stole everything from the house. When they were leaving, they told me, ‘You had better flee, the Ukrainians are coming.’”

3. Pudding: How are the Ukrainians able to move so quickly through Kursk?

General Gerasimov: They aren’t stopping to loot.

Pudding: Amateurs.

4. We used to think the Russians were the second-best army in the world. Now we know they are the second-best army in Russia. (In my opinion, Antony Blinken finally put this joke to rest after telling it in June of 2023, over a year after the rest of the world was already sick of it. Amateur.).

5. Why did the Ukrainians invade Russia? So they could use their own toilets.

6. [Video] Those Hardheaded Russians

I never like the idea of portraying any Russian as “tough,” but come on. This week’s video is of a Russian soldier who head butts an FPV drone, then goes about his business like nothing happened. Maybe they just don’t make FPV drones like they used to eight months ago.