Besieged: This Week in Ukraine

A war of the people, defeatism, a glimpse into Russian weapons manufacturing, and more.

Massive air attacks continued across Ukraine this week.

1. The War Cities

This week, Russia continued its strategic air attacks across Ukraine. The main target was energy infrastructure, including strikes in central Kyiv, western Lviv, and the southern port city of Odesa. Yet, some cities that have been hit the hardest since the beginning of the war are what I call the War Cities, located nearest the front, including Kharkiv, Kramatorsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson.    

The War Cities’ proximity to the threat makes them especially vulnerable to a Russian attack, not only by missiles and long-range drones but by bombs and, in the case of Kherson, artillery. While the wail of air raid sirens has been a relatively cyclical event in Kyiv, the alarms are continuous in the eastern cities. In those urban areas, you can often hear the muffled boom of a far-off explosion. At night, a sulfur smell, like fireworks, lingers in the air. Recently, for the Ukrainians whose homes are under renewed attack, the explosions are louder and closer, and the smell of burning is more pungent.

Yet, life goes on unabated, because it has to. Given the frequency of air raids in the War Cities, it would be impracticable to stop and shelter for every siren. Admittedly, I’ve ignored many an air raid siren in Ukraine. Half of my first lunchtime interview in Kharkiv was interrupted by an air raid. In Zaporizhzhia, I remember walking down the street, sirens blaring, pedestrians ignoring them, patrons eating in sidewalk cafes. In May, in Kramatorsk, I sat interviewing in a coffee shop. A month later, a Russian missile destroyed a pizza restaurant in the city, killing 11. Everywhere in Ukraine is at risk, but especially in the War Cities.

The Park Hotel in the center of Kharkiv, before and after. I stayed in this hotel in May. In January of this year, it was destroyed by two Russian S-300 missiles.

Recently, Russia has increased its use of glide bombs—long-range bombs with wings to extend their range released from aircraft. On Wednesday, Russia supposedly used glide bombs to attack Kharkiv, hitting a school and wounding several children. What the glide bombs lack in accuracy, they make up in explosive power. Citizens in towns near the front are typically desensitized to the sounds of explosions. In September, I was in a town north of Orikhiv on the Southern front when a bomb exploded in a field less than half a mile from the central part of the settlement where my translator and I were waiting to conduct some interviews. That boom seemed to shake the town and made the locals take notice. Although I convinced my companion to begrudgingly drive to the bomb site, I could not persuade him to stop and allow me to walk through people’s backyards to get a photo of the hole. He was, rightfully so, always leery of excessive “war tourism.” Later, some of the soldiers told us they thought the bomb was a FAB-500 (the number corresponding to the bomb’s weight in kilograms).

It may be impossible for Ukraine to stop Russia’s attack on these frontier cities. Major air defense artillery (ADA) systems, like the US Patriot and NASAMS, are ineffective (or at the very least cost-prohibitive) against these bombs, some of which can glide 90 kilometers. Shooting down the Russian planes that drop them is an option, although Ukraine is running low on all types of ADA ammunition, including for their indigenous systems. Moving ADA systems forward into effective range is a risky proposition, as they become instant high-value targets on a battlefield where it’s difficult to hide anything. With Ukrainian offensive capability stalled and invading Russia essentially off the table, creating an adequate buffer zone for the War Cities is impossible. Russia seems very aware of its glide-bomb advantage—recently, the Kremlin has begun mass production of these bombs, including FAB-3000s.  

So what does this mean for the war and Ukrainians? These attacks against the population and critical infrastructure will continue, probably until the end of the war. Russia is procuring or steadily ramping up the manufacture of drones, bombs, and missiles. Western ammunition supplies are dwindling, and US support is faltering. Regardless, the cost curve for prolonged air-attack attrition does not favor the defender. Unless Ukraine attacks the source of procurement (funding, manufacturing, launch facilities and equipment), Russia can and will continue these attacks indefinitely. Ultimately, strategic air attacks won’t force Ukraine to surrender, but it will make life more grueling for its people.

In a clear example of Russian bro-science, we find a BMP-1 with welded antennae to mitigate FPV damage.

2. Barbarians at the Ivory Tower Gate

This week, two economists from UC Berkley, Yuriy Gorodnichenko and Gerard Roland, wrote an article entitled Defeatists will be on the wrong side of history. They explain that regardless of Western support, “The Ukrainian Army has been able to show not only its resilience but also its extraordinary capacity to innovate and adapt fast to the circumstances of war. The war would certainly last longer and claim more innocent victims, but the Ukrainian military would still be able to defeat Russian forces through ‘death by a thousand cuts.’” I agree with the authors that Ukraine would never quit, but those cuts slice both ways. After all Ukraine has been through, I would hate in the end for Ukrainian society to be worse off than Russia.

Like other interested parties, the authors imply that any thought of negotiation is “toxic negativity.” I disagree. I think we (the West and Ukraine) need to elevate the negotiation discussion beyond the dichotomy of “never negotiate” or “negotiate now.” We need to debate the merits of a settlement, including possible scenarios and timing. To be clear, I am not in the “negotiate now” camp. I still think there is hope for Ukraine (and the United States of America) to drive our enemies before us. But when the time comes, when we have forced Putin (or his successor) to the negotiation table, we should be prepared. Having a negotiation strategy means having an end state. Having an end state means having a strategy to achieve it.

3. [Podcast] The Bureaucracy is the Way

The war in Ukraine is not just about the battlefield—winning the war means keeping society together, especially in a democracy. Part of that cohesion is maintaining effective civilian-military relations. My friend, Alex Chinchilla, hosts a great episode of West Point’s Social Science of War Podcast: Why Defense Reform in Ukraine is Crucial. The pod touches on some hot issues, including Zaluzhny (aka Gen Z), corruption in the Ukrainian military acquisitions system, and the lack of Western presence in Ukraine.  

4. [Video] How the Sausage is Made

In this week’s video, we find the Russian Minister of Defense, Sergei Shoigu, touring an arms manufacturing facility. They had me until “Remove the rear-view mirrors. I don’t want them to back up. Only go forward.”