Between traveling twice to Ukraine, putting out the daily podcast, and the holiday season, I have been negligent in publishing the weekly Substack. To appease the readers, I offer a modified transcript of the 2025 Prediction Episode of the Flash Traffic Podcast [you can hear the entire podcast here]. My predictions are in three major groups: the forthcoming Trump attempt at peace negotiations, operations and tactics on the battlefield, and a random hodgepodge of predictions that have little or no connection to the war. As the Yogi Bara cliché goes, "making predictions is hard, especially about the future."
Peace Negotiations in 2025
Ultimately, these negotiations will break down, any ceasefire will be broken (by both sides), and the talks will probably wrap up by March.
Both sides have to feel that they have an acceptable deal. That's the going-in proposition, and that's the hard constraint. After achieving that criterion, both sides simply try to get the best possible outcome. But unless both sides have the bare minimum, a settlement is impossible.
What's the bare minimum that Russia needs out of this negotiation? Ukrainian territory is desirable, but only Kursk (originally Russian territory) is part of the bare minimum. For Putin, he needs to put himself in a position of control over Ukraine politically and position himself for future military action. So that means no to Ukraine in NATO (and no to NATO in Ukraine, more below). I consider NATO membership a red herring, a fake issue in this negotiation, because the West will never allow Ukraine to join NATO, and everyone knows it.
Putin is also demanding a new, "legitimate" government in Ukraine. This idea is also a non-player because Zelensky will probably not be the president of Ukraine 10 seconds after this war.
The real issue is that Russia can't stand to have Western troops in Ukraine. It will undermine future attempts to control or invade Ukraine. Significant territorial gains in the Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donets, or Luhansk oblasts are insufficient to quell Russia's imperialistic desires. Putin must have a negotiation that minimizes and disenfranchises Western involvement in Ukraine (until the next full-scale invasion, of course).
The Russian minimum required negotiation results are entirely opposed to those of the Ukrainians. The Ukrainians need long-term security, in whatever form that might take. The most probable Western guarantee would be some military presence and a military-industrial and financial agreement. Any arrangement that would actually ensure Ukraine's future would be directly opposed to Russia's ultimate goals and thus completely unacceptable to Putin.
So, neither side will meet the bare minimum in this negotiation. The war is going to continue, and I think Russia is OK with that. For all the economic, military equipment, and manning problems Putin seems to have, I think he's comfortable continuing the war. More so than Zelensky, for sure. If you look at a sunk-cost analysis of Putin's position moving forward, why wouldn't he continue? He's making incremental gains across the front. He's still supported by a number of countries. His political situation inside Russia is stable. And the world still needs oil. The Ukrainians appear to be ready to snap any day. The US is pulling out. Europe is in disarray. Putin might take a sweetheart deal (that I don't think the Ukrainians would accept), but I think he's also OK just continuing the war for another year.
On the negotiations, I think the first legitimate attempt will be a cacophonous orgy of arrogant states disjointedly attempting to exert their influence on a premature proceeding. If one reflects on Ukraine in 2014, 2015, and 2016, when there were the Minsk I and the Minsk II agreements, we saw Germany, France, and Russia in what they called the Normandy format. It was ineffective. The US and the UK weren't even in those negotiations. This time, it will be the US, the UK, France, Germany, and Russia. And wow, I'm sure that will work much better with more players. Maybe they can call this chaos the "Mar-a-Lago Format."
Lastly, there's Trump's envoy to Ukraine, Keith Kellogg. He was Mike Pence's national security advisor. That's like being the presidential dietitian to Bill Clinton. What a worthless job. Plus, he's a Trump "yes man" and 80 years old. While I'm sure there are a lot of 80-year-olds out there who can do wonderful things for their country, we need someone sharp and energetic. Henry Kissinger was Nixon's national security advisor and Secretary of State when Kissinger was in his 50s. In his 80s, Henry Kissinger wasn't doing anything except letting people ghostwrite bad foreign policy books for him. Keith Kellogg is a terrible pick to represent the United States in any Ukraine peace process.
There will be no end to the war. I think negotiations will be kaput by about March, and the war will continue throughout 2025.
The Battlefield in 2025
Given that my first prediction is correct and the war continues through the year, I have made some predictions on how the fighting might play out. Granted, these prognostications are based more on my years as a US Army officer and my many (often painful) trips to the frontlines in Ukraine, more of my gut feeling than academic analysis (not that there is much valid academic data on the war). Again, I'll put myself out there for right or wrong; the more specific the prediction, the more probable it will be wrong, but I think the more valuable the line of reasoning to get there.
Battlefield Prediction One: Two Major Ukrainian Offensives
Ukraine will attempt to mount two major maneuver offensives in late spring or summer. The first one will be in the Russian border area, similar to the Kursk excursion, but it will be in Belgorod. It will be a mutually supporting attack in a weak area on the border. The Ukrainians will attack for the same reasons as the original attack into Kursk in August of 2024 (opportunity for surprise, political leverage, distract the Kremlin from the Donbas, promote esprit de corps, increase morale). [As a note, the podcast this transcript originated from was published on December 30th, 2024. On January 5th, the Ukrainians began some yet-undefined offensive in the northeast of the Kursk salient.]
The second big assault will be in the Kharkiv area, directly eastward of the city. The Russians have lost interest in the area, which usually means they will leave that front insufficiently resourced. I think these two significant assaults will be mutually supporting operations. Both assaults will be maneuver warfare, and both will ultimately end poorly. Offensive operations are difficult, especially against a million Russian drones.
Battlefield Prediction Two: The Kursk Salient Will Close
The second battlefield prediction has to do with Kursk. I think this is an easy one for me. I believe in 2025, the Russians will take back all the currently Ukrainian-occupied territory in Russia. The logistics of the Kursk salient, with only one major road through the central Ukrainian-held Russian town of Sudzha, makes it difficult to hold. The Russians are already closing in. The salient is collapsing. At the time of this podcast, the salient is only about 10 miles wide. As much as the Ukrainians want to hold on to Kursk, I think the dynamics of attrition warfare will be too much for them, especially if the North Koreans send additional troops to the area beyond the 10k or so already there.
Battlefield Prediction Three: Russian Armored Vehicle Supply Will Stabilize There's a lot of talk about how Russia is running out of vehicles. They are assaulting in civilian SUVs, Chinese golf carts, motorcycles, and electric scooters. There is a rather prolific belief (held by many, including my fellow podcaster Eric Lyon) that Russia will run out of vehicles by the summer of 2025. I have taken a contrarian view on this subject. I think they will have a steady supply of armored vehicles through 2025.
Russian indigenous production of armored vehicles will increase dramatically (it already has, in some regard) in the next year. They're going to get a number of vehicles from North Korea. And I think they might get some from vehicles, armored vehicles, from another country, perhaps China. In 2025, the Russians will not be assaulting exclusively with SUVs and scooters. The SUV trend we're seeing will reverse.
Battlefield Prediction Four: One Million Russian Casualties
We're going to see the casualty count reach a million for Russia in 2025. That's not an incredible prediction; it just follows the current trend line. What is perhaps more interesting is the corresponding Ukrainian casualties. If the Ukrainians sustain even a 3:1 casualty ratio (and I think that's generous), that's a lot of lost Ukrainian soldiers. It will hurt Ukraine more than Russia, by far.
Battlefield Prediction Five: Ukraine Will Expand Its Strategic Air Attacks
One shining area in the war for Ukraine has been its ability to cause pain deep inside Russia with its indigenous air capability, namely its long-range drones. In 2025, I think Ukraine will reinforce its success in this capability. It will significantly expand the production of these drones. We will see a marked increase in range and number of vulnerable Russian targets. And, I think we'll see a new kind of target genre outside of oil refineries and military storage. We're going to see something different. It may be power grids. It may be something else, but they will start attacking something other than oil refineries, ammo dumps, and airfields.
Battlefield Prediction Six: Ukraine Will Sink the First Russian-Navy Capital Ship Not in the Black Sea
Ships in the North Fleet would be the most likely targets. But with an expansion of the strategic air and sea drone capability, the Russians' slowness to adapt to these threats, and the general incompetence in the Russian strategic air-defense complex, Ukraine will begin sinking more of the Russian Navy, and it will be glorious.
Battlefield Prediction Seven: We Will See the First Significant Drone-Swarm Attack on the Battlefield
Drone technology is advancing every week in Ukraine. Both sides are already using artificial intelligence in drones. A drone swarm (I define it as 10 or more drones flying simultaneously in the same 1-kilometer by 1-kilometer grid square) will become a reality. Here's the twist: it's going to be done first by the Russians. In speaking with drone operators and R&D specialists in Ukraine recently, they believe that software is the only area in which the Russians are ahead in drone production. The ability for drones to fly in a swarm is primarily a software-based operation. Plus, the innovation cycle for Ukraine is faster than that of Russians (that is, the Ukrainians are producing new drones every month). Russia's lagging, painfully standardized drone production may actually allow them to focus on the software development of a standardized hardware type of drone.
Lightning Round of 2025 Predictions
Finally, here are several predictions that have no basis in anything—they are pretty much random thoughts—just like your average stock investor newsletter!
Lightning Prediction One: I believe that by Christmas next year, the ruble will be exactly the same as it is now, around 100 rubles per US dollar. Yes, yes, the Russian economy is weakening. I get it. But are you still buying gas for your car? Yes?
Lightning Prediction Two: Ukraine will drop the mobilization age to 23. That's not a huge prediction, but they need personnel. The current age is 25.
Lightning Prediction Three: Nothing is going to happen in Georgia. Nothing of any significance is going to happen in Moldova. It's going to be business as usual. A year from now, we're going to be looking at the same bullshit in both of those countries.
Lightning Prediction Four: I think HTS (Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham) and Syria will collapse into chaos by the end of 2025. I think battle lines will be drawn. HTS is already trying to be everybody's buddy. I think it's just going to implode into a giant shit show.
Lightning Prediction Five: We will see the first blockbuster movie completely written, produced, and starred in by artificial intelligence. Along those lines, by the end of next year, 75 % of all Netflix shows will be written by artificial intelligence. It's all garbage now anyway; just let the computer do it.
Lightning Prediction Six: My last prediction for 2025 is that Tesla's stock price will fall to $250 per share (split or negative split-adjusted). As of this podcast publication, the stock price was around $430 per share. The stock, of course, is already NOT based on value. [Full disclosure, I do not maintain a position, long or short in Tesla]. Musk is going to have a fallout with Trump. The tariff war in China is going to affect Tesla. US automakers are going to get their shit together and make an EV vehicle that isn't garbage (probably not on that one).
And that's it—my predictions for 2025. Feel free to comment on where you think I'm right or wrong (and please feel free to include your logic in the comments).
Any settlement short of integrating Ukraine into greater Europe simply sets up its final destruction as an independent nation….as long as Putin is in power.